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Beyond Social Exchange Theory: 
An Integrative Look at Transcendent  
Mental Models for Engagement 
 
Latha Poonamallee and Sonia Goltz1 
 
Abstract: In this paper, we develop an integrative conceptual framework capturing the 
underlying mental models that guide engagement in relationships at work and elsewhere. 
Specifically, we are looking at mental models that go beyond egocentrism and social 
exchange, which have served as the basis for most frameworks found in research on 
organizations. The goal of this paper is to present a more complex picture of human 
cognition and behavior that suggests that egocentrism is not an exclusive motivator. We 
view this more integrative framework as a set of concentric circles of increasingly 
inclusive and expansive identities.  Although the mental models used by individuals may 
be static over a shorter time frame, they are thought to be more dynamic over a relatively 
longer timeframe, in adaptive response to changing conditions.  Movement between these 
mental models can be triggered by changes in cognitions as well as by events that arouse 
affect. 
 
Keywords: mental models, cognition, positive organizational scholarship, transcendent 
spirituality 
 
Introduction 
 
Mental models are internal representations of reality held by individuals to guide interactions 
with external objects or systems (e.g., Jones, Ross, Lynam, Perez, & Leitch, 2011; Rouse & 
Morris, 1986). This paper conceptualizes an integrative framework outlining the mental models 
that might underlie various forms of individual and organizational engagement, thereby 
presenting a more complex picture of human cognition and behavior than has been typical in 
existing research on behavior in organizations. Drawing on recent research on top-down and 
bottom-up mechanisms in emotion generation (Oschner, et al., 2009), we also describe the 
interplay between cognitive and affective processes that shape such mental models.  
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The concept of mental models developed in large part in the literature on manual control in 
terms of psychomotor performance (e.g., Conant & Ashby, 1970) and was later adopted by 
cognitive psychologists, who conceptualized mental models as descriptions of a system’s form, 
in terms of relationships among components, functioning, and dynamics (e.g., Mathieu et al., 
2000).  These descriptions are thought to allow individuals to form expectations for what is 
likely to occur next and decide what actions to take (e.g., Mathieu et al., 2000; Rouse & Morris, 
1986). For example, teammates often share agreed upon mental models of important aspects 
such as the group task and team operations (e.g., Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-
Bowers, 2000; Maynard & Gilson, 2013). Similar team mental models allow members to predict 
what their teammates will need and will be doing, facilitating coordination activities (Mathieu, et 
al, 2000), which then leads to improved performance (Lim & Klein, 2006).  
 
However, mental models vary in accuracy and development, in part due to the experience of 
the individual with the system being described by the mental model, which might be too limited 
to completely portray a complex system (for discussions, see Rousseau, 2001 and Jones et al., 
2013). Furthermore, our minds are full of conflicting mental models since we tend to maintain 
overlapping and inconsistent mental models (Lane, 1992).  In part this is because these models 
are context-dependent and may change depending on the situation (Jones et al., 2011). Also, our 
mental models can be expected to be fairly resistant to change, given that individuals tend to 
focus on information that supports existing beliefs (e.g., Swann & Read, 1981).  Individual 
mental models will change when individuals are motivated to more deeply process information 
that is discrepant with their models rather than stick with the tendency to superficially assess and 
discount it (e.g., Rousseau, 2001).  Still, mental models tend to change slowly rather than 
suddenly (e.g., Welch Larson, 1994). 
 
An example of a mental model guiding human behavior and interactions that has been slow to 
change is the assumption that much of human behavior is based on ego-centrism and social 
exchange. In fact, this model has served as the basis for most theoretical approaches found in 
research on organizations, given that much of our research on work behavior is based on models 
of social psychology.  These models mostly view social exchange as an economic choice among 
alternatives in which individuals attempt to maximize their expected utility (Kahan & Rapaport, 
1984; Sunahara & Pierce, 1982). Although these mental models have been useful in generating 
research on human behavior, these efforts may have reached maturity. Assuming human work 
behavior is primarily egocentric in nature, has the potential for missing behavior that is not 
egocentric.  Atypical behaviors that do not fit neatly into the mental model of egocentricity are 
not likely to be examined or even noticed.    
 
Therefore, in this paper, we consider mental models that are broader. Drawing on existing 
literature, we have built an integrative model of engagement, which we view as a set of 
concentric circles of increasingly inclusive and expansive identities, thereby extending the 
understanding of human cognition and behavior to include motivations beyond egocentric social 
exchange. The first or innermost circle is based on ego as one’s identity and social exchange 
theory as the operating mental model for human interaction. In the second circle, we look at a 
mental model based on a group or tribal identity that shares interests, passions, and affective 
bonds including organizations, industries, and even virtual groups. The key feature of this circle 
is the suspension of the usual social exchange norms and extension of benevolence to those who 
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are part of the group. The third circle describes a transcendent mental model that involves 
moving from a primary concern for the tribe and temporary prosocial behaviors directed at 
outsiders to experiencing enduring changes in an individual’s concern about others’ welfare 
leading to a sense of oneness and a merging of self-other boundaries.  
 
Specifically, this paper makes two contributions. First, by using the top-down and bottom-up 
approach to emotions, it broadens the scope of mental models to include the role of the 
‘affective’ component in a mental model and describes the interplay between cognitive and 
affective processes that underlie a mental model. Second, by describing the mental models 
underlying the three circles and the mechanisms of movement between them, this paper 
illuminates how more expansive mental models can produce a more complex cognitive response 
to phenomena. By doing this, it also offers the beginnings of a blueprint for how to shift mental 
models at a collective level.  It should be noted that, although researchers have worked on multi-
level research (e.g., Rousseau, 1985), they have not explicated the mental models that individuals 
and organizations operate from in their interactions with each of these levels. For example, often 
individuals and organizations are completely unaware of and indifferent to factors at larger 
levels, such as social structures, that are affecting them, instead operating from a very local point 
of view.  Their lack of awareness of and indifference to factors operating at larger and more 
complex levels negatively impacts their ability to solve problems directly affecting them.   
 
We begin with a brief review of the literature on mental models.  We also describe the key 
elements that go into the making of mental models and the relationship between the various 
elements. We then describe and discuss our integrative model for engagement and its three 
circles in detail and speculate how the various mental models may interact with each other. 
                                  
Making of Mental Models 
 
The key elements that we believe contribute to mental models of appropriate social behavior 
are cognitive framing (particularly social identity) and affective arousal. We have identified the 
two processes based on recent brain research (Ochsner, et al., 2009) that suggests that emotions 
can be generated through either cognitive constructions and interpretation that lead to emotions 
or through the experience of immediate affect which then can leads to cognitions. Poonamallee 
(2012) uses this framework to describe the role of socio-ecological values and the interplay 
between cognitive framing, and affective arousal elements in the rousing of compassion to 
strangers during disasters. In this paper, the author demonstrates how in the case of the Asian 
Tsunami, cognitive framing of the society and the affected populations as well as the emotional 
valence and portrayal of the disaster stories by the mass media (and by proxy, the society itself) 
influenced the construction of a collective identity, thus rousing compassion towards strangers.  
 
We conceive of mental models as being generated either cognitively through top-down 
processing or affectively through bottom-up processing or through complex interactions between 
both systems.  The particular triggers that affect which process occurs will be considered later. 
At this point, however, we simply wish to introduce the top-down and bottom-up components.  
Research suggests that individuals’ interactions with others are affected by both cognitions and 
affect.  For example, although some scholars view social identity as purely cognition based (e.g., 
Ashforth & Mael, 1989), others have defined social identity as a part of self-concept derived 
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from both the knowledge of group membership as well as the emotional significance of that 
membership (e.g., Tajfel, 2010).  Furthermore, research indicates that affect can be more 
predictive of group behavior than cognitions. Van Zomeren et al. (2008) found that affective 
injustice had stronger effects on collective action than non-affective injustice.  It is thought that 
group-based affect helps link group cognitions to group action (e.g., Van Zomeron et al., 2008; 
Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003).   Therefore, it is likely that mental models that 
are shared by a group, such as those concerning collective action, have both cognitive and 
affective components, with group affect sometimes influencing group cognitions and vice versa. 
For this reason, we expect that even group-based mental models that are influenced heavily by 
cognitions such as social identity can be strongly influenced by affective variables as well. 
 
Top-down Mechanism: Cognitive Framing  
 
We begin our discussion by considering the cognitive framing aspect of mental models.  
Although most mental models are probably fairly developed (although perhaps incomplete) 
representations of systems that allow one to interact appropriately with those systems, most 
probably took their initial forms with a basic view point, or frame, that served as a guideline for 
the construction of the mental model. Frames are cognitive structures that focus, articulate, and 
transform, which operate at both the individual and group levels (Snow, 2007).  Frames are 
essentially central organizing ideas that can steer an audience by providing particular meanings, 
thus operating as interpretive mechanisms (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987).   They are influenced 
by reference points and carry this information (McKenzie & Nelson, 2003).  Campbell (2006) 
describes frames as: “metaphors, symbols, and cognitive cues that cast issues in a particular 
light and suggest possible ways to respond to these issues. Framing involves the strategic 
creation and manipulation of shared understandings and interpretations of the world, its 
problems, and viable courses of action” (Campbell, 2006, p. 48-49). Although some literature on 
framing includes the affective aspect, in this paper, we use Campbell’s definition of framing as a 
cognitive mechanism to distinguish it from the process of affective arousal.  
 
Understanding the effect of framing has been useful in a variety of literatures.  For example, 
framing perspectives in the social movement’s literature emerged in response to the void in 
exploring the relevance of interpretive processes for mobilization (Snow, 2007). It is also used 
by disaster researchers (Argothy, 2003; Cottle, 2006; Hoijer, 2004; Rodriquez, Trainor & 
Quarantelli, 2006; Tierney, Bevc & Kuligowski, 2006). In this literature, frames are thought to 
both empower and limit reality and have the power to provide edited or fragmented versions of 
reality (Argothy, 2003). Framing has also been examined in organization studies and 
management, such as with positive and negative framing in decision-making contexts (e.g., 
MacKenzie & Nelson, 2003) and in discussions of sense-making (Weick, 1995) and sensegiving 
(Gioia & Chittipedi, 1991; Maitlis, 2005) processes.   Additionally, decision framing has been 
applied to understand effects such as individual judgments about organizational justice.  Positive 
frames, for example, are thought to reduce the need for sense-making of outcomes received, 
thereby reducing the importance of procedural justice (Brockner, Wisenfeld, & Martin, 1995).  
Additionally, it has been found that individuals make sense of procedural justice differently 
depending on whether they identify strongly or weakly with a particular group (Tyler, 1999). 
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 A frame of particular importance to mental models for interaction and engagement is social 
identity.  Framing processes play a critical role in the development and maintenance of 
individual and collective identities (Hunt, Benford, & Snow, 1994).  Social identity is that part of 
self-concept that is defined by membership within a group (Tajfel, 2010).  People classify 
themselves and others into social categories, in part to be able to define and order the social 
environment and in part, to locate and define themselves Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Turner, 2010).  
People seek to maintain a positive social identity to boost self-esteem, such as by making 
comparisons with out-group members (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).  Social identity theory has helped 
explain in-group bias and out-group stereotyping among other group behaviors (Brown, 2000).  
But these identities can affect individual framing and behaviors as well.  Identifying with a group 
leads to individual behaviors supporting the group’s behaviors and its values and norms 
(Ashforth & Mael, 1989).  For example, through perceptions of group-based deprivation, social 
identity can help mobilize people for collective action that benefits group members, which is 
unlikely to occur through egoistic (individual-based) deprivation (Drury & Reicher, 1999; Van 
Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).  On the other hand, since social identity also can also lead 
to major social conflicts between in-group and out-group members, it has been suggested that 
policies that redirect people to have more overlapping and inclusive identities are needed 
(Brown, 2000). 
 
Bottom-up Mechanism: Affective Arousal 
 
The second major element thought to affect the construction of mental models is affective in 
nature. The heart of emotion has also sometimes been called core affect, which refers to a 
primitive, universal and irreducible subjective experience consisting of both a pleasure-
displeasure dimension and an arousal dimension (Russell, 2003).  Emotions help guide goal-
directed human behavior, allowing people to adjust to environmental changes because they 
signal when an important goal is threatened and needs attention (Kaufman, 1999).   Among other 
things, emotional arousal is a key element that guides people’s engagement with others, thanks in 
part to evolutionary processes, which helped create a central nervous system that responds to the 
complex social world of primates via emotional processes such as empathy (Brothers, 1990; 
Preston & de Waal, 2002).  Empathy and trust, two essential elements in positive human 
interaction and interpersonal cooperation, consist of both affective and cognitive components 
(Brems, 1989; Duan Hill, 1996; McAllister, 1995). They are associated with a release in 
oxytocin (Barraza & Zak, 2009; Baumgartner, Heinrichs, Vonlanthen, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 
2008), a hormone synthesized in the hypothalamus and released to areas associated with 
emotions and social behaviors. 
 
One particular factor that can stimulate empathic emotions, an important component in the 
present analysis, is the presence of others who are in need or suffering in some way.  
Psychologists have noted that emotions can serve as two different types of motivators when 
others are in need or suffering:  individuals can be motivated to reduce their own distress from 
viewing the distress of others or they can be focused on relieving the stress of others (Batson, 
1991; Batson & Oleson, 1991).  Empathy and distress appear to work against each other 
physiologically (Barraza & Zak, 2009) and research indicates that personal distress and prosocial 
behavior are negatively correlated whereas empathy and prosocial behavior are positively 
correlated (Batson, 1998; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1998).  However, the relationship between 
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empathy and prosocial behavior has been moderate, indicating that there are several dispositional 
and situational moderators of the relationship (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Eisenberg, 2000).  
Consistent with this, it has been found that individual responses to others who are in need are 
also based on the appraisal of the others’ relevance to their own salient goals and values, their 
own self-definition, and the extent to which the others are seen as deserving of assistance base on 
these beliefs. For example, Goetz, Keltner, and Simon-Thomas (2010) reported that an actor’s 
compassion is aroused by the degree to which his or her own values and beliefs about the 
constitution of good character, positive meaning, human worth and humanitarian ideals are 
perceived as consistent with and/or signaled by the sufferer’s characteristics, situation, and/or 
social make-up. 
 
Top-down and Bottom-up Processing 
 
We have based our conception of how mental models for human interactions are developed 
on brain research into emotions. Brain research indicates that emotions can be generated through 
either cognitive constructions and interpretation that lead to emotions or through the experience 
of immediate affect which then can lead to cognitions (Ochsner, et al., 2009).   The former type 
of generation has been called top-down and triggers interactions between the prefrontal cortex 
areas involving working memory and information retrieval and the left amygdala (Ochsner et al., 
2009). [The amygdalae have been found to be involved in responses to emotionally salient 
stimuli (Ledoux, 2000; Phelps, 2006).] The latter type has been called bottom-up and stimulates 
both the right and left amygdalae as well as the occipital, prefrontal, and parietal parts of the 
brain which are implicated in attentional processes and encoding into memory (Ochsner et al., 
2009).  Thus, top-down and bottom-up processes use distinct cortical networks (Ochsner et al., 
2009). However, both types of processing are likely to be active in many situations (Ochsner et 
al., 2009). Top-down processing is thought to be semantic in nature, involving cognitive 
complexity that plays a role in emotional regulation whereas bottom-up processing is thought to 
be important for attention shifting in terms of detection of changes in the environment and 
potential threats (Ochsner et al., 2009).  This is similar to the processes that Kahneman (2011) 
terms Systems 1 and 2 in the mind. System 1 operates on automaticity without any sense of 
voluntary control and System 2 involves effortful mental activities. 
 
Bottom-up processing is more sensitive to changes in the environment than top-down 
processing, and top-down processing helps produce more long-term behavioral repertoires that 
are effective, but that can also be less sensitive to environmental changes, at least initially. Note 
for example, that much of human behavior is maintained by if-then rules describing 
contingencies rather than by the actual contingencies themselves since consequences for 
behavior are often delayed (see, for example, Malott, Shimamune, & Malott,1992; Weatherly & 
Malott, 2008).   However, the rules individuals follow can lead them to be insensitive to the 
actual contingencies operating in the organization, producing dysfunctional behavior (e.g., 
Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999).  In fact, it has been suggested that top-down and bottom-up 
processing have implications for how to change dysfunctional behavior, with behaviors being 
generated by top-down processes being more responsive to cognitive methods that restructure 
interpretations of the situation and behaviors originating bottom-up being more responsive to 
behavioral reinforcement methods that reshape responses through desired and aversive stimuli 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Ochsner et al., 2009; Quirk & Beer, 2006).  
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Considering that both top-down and bottom-up processing contribute to mental models used 
in human social interactions can help us reconcile what seem to be opposing theoretical 
viewpoints of behavior.  For example, altruistic behavior has been conceptualized in a variety of 
ways by researchers. Hirschleifer (1983) takes an economic approach to post-disaster 
cooperative behaviors and describes a theory of post-disaster altruistic behavior as consistent 
with enlightened self-interest.  This would be consistent with a top-down cognitively generated 
mental model of appropriate social behavior. However, it has also been suggested that prosocial 
behaviors may be triggered due to personal distress because people can see themselves as 
potential sufferers (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). This conceptual approach appears to describe a 
bottom-up affectively constructed mental model. More than likely, each theoretical approach 
accurately, but only partially, accounts for prosocial and altruistic behavior, and there are likely 
even other explanations of this behavior not yet elucidated that involved complex, reciprocal 
processing between cognitive and affective brain structures. 
Following, we present the three circles found in the integrative framework. 
 
The Integrative Framework 
 
In our view, this framework has the potential for a multitude of applications in various social 
settings.  For purposes of illustration however, we will focus on two management research areas 
that we believe could particularly benefit from the integrative framework, organizational justice 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Organizational actions in these two realms reflect 
underlying collective mental models about engagement and responsibility. CSR should concern 
multiple stakeholder groups beyond the immediate employees, including global organizational 
and inter-organizational initiatives with groups of people who may not directly interact 
otherwise, which   falls in the circle three of our integrative model.  However, organizations that 
have historically been concerned more with circle one and two themes may find CSR outside of 
these circles difficult.  Similarly, the organizational justice literature usually has been concerned 
mostly with justice within an organization, falling squarely in circles one and two of our 
framework.  However, there have been calls to extend the concept of organizational justice to 
stakeholders outside the organization, which the framework could help accomplish.  
 
We conceive of the integrative framework as consisting of concentric circles of successively 
expanding identities that serve as the basis for mental models for engagement (see Figure 1). 
These circles are constructed with three dimensions: awareness of time-orientation, scope of 
impact, and directionality of relationships (see Table 1). We believe that movement between 
these circles occurs and depends to a large extent on the complex interplay of cognitions and 
emotions. We will discuss this more with respect to each circle in our framework. We will also 
speculate on the interactions between the mental models underlying the three circles.  
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Figure 1: Beyond Social Exchange Theory: Integrative Framework 
Table 1: Awareness Dimensions 
Circle/Dimension Time Orientation Scope of Impact Directionality of 
Relationships 
First Circle Short-term Self/Ego Simple, One way: 
Me Vs the world 
Second Circle Short-term and Medium-
term 
Self and immediate 
and related others 
Restricted two-way: 
Us Vs the world 
Third Circle Long term Self, 
immediate/related 
others, and distant 
strangers/universe 
Complex, inter-
connected: Me in the 
world 
 
First Circle: “Ego-centric” 
 
Much of research on work behavior has been rooted in models of social psychology, many of 
which have been based on economic conceptualizations of choice. Economic conceptualizations 
often assume that individuals are motivated to pursue their own ends in a way that minimizes 
costs and maximizes profits, which has been called "instrumental rationality" (Weber, 1978).  
Human interactions are viewed as a set of exchanges with rewards and costs and individuals are 
thought to decide whom to interact with based on expectations of these rewards and costs (Kahan 
& Rapoport, 1984).   
 
Transcendental ‐
Expanded Identity of 
Interdependence
Tribal Centric ‐Ingroup 
Identity 
Ego centric ‐
Individually centered 
identity
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This circle can be viewed as being parallel to the first of the neo-Kohlbergian major stages of 
moral reasoning, in which the “personal interests schema” is used (Narvaez, 2005).  In this type 
of thinking, a person uses the filter of how does this affect my personal interest, with no socio-
centric perspective involved.  Cooperation with others is at the very micro level of thinking, with 
personal advantage being seen as a virtue (Narvaez, 2005).  We can see this emphasis on ego-
centric social exchange in models of various work and organizational behavior, such as 
motivation, organizational justice, power, and psychological contracts. For example, the 
expectancy (e.g., Porter & Lawler, 1968; Vroom, 1964) and equity (e.g., Garland, 1973; 
Vecchio, 1981) theories of motivation are directly based on the instrumental rationality model 
found in economics. Similarly, most conceptualizations of organizational justice (e.g., Fortin & 
Fellenz, 2008), are based on social exchange concepts derived from economic principles 
(e.g.Homans, 1974; Thibaut & Kelly, 1959).   So are most of the understandings about power 
(for a discussion see Goltz, 2011). Yet another example is the idea of psychological contracts 
(Rousseau, 1989), which in turn is viewed as central to the concept of organizational justice 
Cropanzano & Prehar, 2001). 
 
Certainly, the explanation of human work behavior as primarily being driven by ego concerns 
appears to be supported by empirical studies. For example, the literature is replete with data 
indicating that individuals treat the concept of fairness differently depending upon whether it is 
directed toward others or toward themselves. Individuals overestimate their own performance 
(Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1977; Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977), tend to attribute 
success to themselves and factors under their control and failures to external factors (e.g., see 
Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004 for a review), and tend to put less effort into creating 
equity after being overcompensated than after being undercompensated (see Campbell & 
Pritchard, 1976 and Greenberg, 1982 for reviews).  Also, studies on power indicate that as power 
increases, power holders generally view others as little more than tools (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, 
& Galinsky, 2008) and are not as concerned with how others experience the world (Galinsky, 
Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006).   
 
On the other hand, it is also well known that studies using purely economic principles to make 
predictions about social behavior often have fallen short (for reviews, see Goeree & Holt, 2001; 
Kagel & Roth, 1995).  For example, fair offers rather than self-interested ones are common in the 
ultimatum game (for recent discussions, see Chiang, 2008; Zollman, 2008). Additionally, the 
tendency of management researchers to take either an economic rationality approach to business 
or a humanistic one that focuses on emotions has been criticized for ignoring the spiritual aspects 
of existence (Gozdz, 2000).  Similarly, the focus on instrumentality in descriptions of social 
power has been criticized for ignoring bases of power that stimulate transcendent responses 
based on the idea of connectedness with others (Goltz, 2011).   
 
Furthermore, ego-centric based behavior can be ultimately self-limiting and it is precisely 
these atypical responses that may help resolve some of the current issues in organizations in the 
two management areas to which we apply out model in this paper. For example, in the area of 
organizational justice, Goltz (2010) found women who believed, despite their failed individual 
discrimination cases, that in the long run, individual attempts at change are important because 
many individual attempts will add up, resulting in slow, evolutionary change, and that it is one’s 
responsibility to be part of this process. Similarly, in the area of corporate social responsibility 
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and sustainability, Baets and Oldenboom (2010) suggest that individuals who act out of a 
consciousness of connectedness are more likely to be able to build sustainable organizations in 
part because they are more able to adapt to the complexity that exists in the world than are 
individuals who think more linearly. This ties back to the dimensions we have listed in Table 1. 
A mental model based on Circle 1 takes a short-term, narrow approach thus limiting 
understanding of relationships to a Me Vs Them viewpoint, which misses the complexity of the 
larger world.  
  
Emotions signal when an important goal is threatened and since individual survival is one of 
those goals, we can certainly see bottom-up processing as frequently playing an important role in 
the development and application of an ego-centric mental model.  Thus, regardless of which 
mental model they might normally use, we would expect individuals to operate egocentrically 
and justifiably so, when feeling fear from threats to individual survival, whether emotional or 
physical survival is threatened.  (Note that this ability to move adaptively from one mental model 
to another depending on the situation distinguishes our framework from models of moral 
development in which individuals are thought to shift permanently.) However, individuals may 
also develop an egocentric mental model via more top-down processes.  For example, 
individuals may reflect on past experience, present circumstances, and future goals and then 
make a conscious choice of a more egocentric strategy because it is seen as being effective for 
meeting their goals.   
 
Second Circle: Tribal-Identity- centric 
 
As discussed in the section on social identity, egocentric behavior can be replaced with 
behavior supporting the values and behaviors of a social group when the antecedents of social 
identity have occurred. We use the term ‘tribal’ to signify such forms of social identity. The 
word ‘tribe’ is borrowed from anthropology used to describe archaic societies that maintain 
social order through affective and non-rational bonds (Cova & Cova, 2002). This word still 
resonates in modern and post-modern societies and is used to signify any group that shares 
interests, passions, and affective bonds including organizations, industries, professional groups 
and even cyber tribes (Poster, 1998). Unlike the traditional tribes that were bound by kinship and 
dialect, post-modern tribes are connected through shared feelings and symbols (Cova & Cova, 
2002). Organizational identification one such specific form of social identification (Ashforth & 
Mael, 1989) and fall in this circle. 
 
Current research on positive emotions (Frederickson, 2001; Kanov, et al., 2002; Lillus, et al, 
2008) and prosocial behaviors in the fields of management and organizational behavior (Grant & 
Francesca, 2010) has given us an insight into a mental model that operates in workplaces which 
foster a shared identity of compassionate and positive organizations. These studies (Kanov, et al., 
2002; Lillius, et al., 2008) reveal the process by which individuals engage in compassionate acts 
within workplaces and how organizations can foster a compassionate culture that in turn 
legitimizes individual acts of compassion. These organizations encourage proactive social 
behaviors through a set of values, practices, and routines (Kanov, et al., 2002). For example, 
Grant’s (2008) study looks at the role of relational job design that encourages and rewards 
prosocial behavior. This stream of research spans a spectrum from forgiveness (Bright, Fry, & 
Cooperrider, 2006), compassion (Kanov, et al., 2002; Lillius, et al., 2008), emotional resilience 
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(Powley, 2009), to virtues (Cameron & Caza, 2002). For an exhaustive review on this stream of 
research, please refer to Donaldson and Ko (2010). 
 
To some extent, this circle parallels the maintaining norms schema found in the neo-
Kohlbergian tradition of moral development. In this phase in the neo-Kohlbergian model, 
individuals have the awareness that people relate to each other through institutions and 
established practices and upholding social order is therefore viewed as being very important 
(Narvaez, 2005).  For example, religious authoritarianism has been found to be related to this 
type of reasoning (Narvaez, 2005).  However, in our framework, it is not the upholding of the 
norms and traditions that is so important, but rather the maintenance of connection to tribal 
identity that is key.  It certainly is the case that upholding social norms is a way to maintain one’s 
connection to tribal identity; thus, we see these frameworks as being conceptually parallel. 
However, we wish to emphasize here that we believe that the motivation to uphold social norms 
arises from tribal identity rather than the reverse. 
 
In this circle, the sense of tribal identity, i.e. a sense of belongingness to a group, 
organization, team, family, or a local community, is fostered through regular interaction, which 
in turn fosters positive sentiment (Homans, 1974).  For example, attachments that govern even 
economic behaviors embedded within networks of social relationships   (e.g., Granovetter, 1985; 
Larson, 1992) are thought to be a critical factor in these interactions (Seabright, Leventhal, & 
Fishman, 1992). Pressure for continuing these economic interactions often will occur even when 
the exchanges obtained from the relationships are no longer economically rational (Seabright, et 
al., 1992).  Economic behavior based on emotional attachments rather than rational calculations 
would be an example of more bottom-up, emotional processing of the tribal mental model rather 
than top-down cognitive processing.   
 
This form of identity is more inclusive than the egocentric one of the first circle. The tribal-
centric mental model has an evolutionary basis in that individuals operating with this model have 
better survival chances than individuals operating alone.  Analyses by anthropological 
archaeologists indicate that groups tend to develop when habitats become poorer or unstable and 
competition for resources increases such as due to overpopulation because groups can provide 
individuals with differential access to resources (e.g., Kennett, Winterholder, Bartruff, & 
Erlandson, 2009). Also, there is a propensity to be most loyal to one’s own kin, known in 
evolutionary biology as Hamilton’s Rule, which specifies the level of altruistic behavior among 
kin that maximizes the survival of one’s genes (e.g., see Bergstrom, 1995).  However, because 
the notion of benevolence is extended only to those who are part of the network, it is still 
restricted because of the dependency on the dynamic of interpersonal relationships within the 
context of a group organization. Also, the other side of a tribal-identity centric mental model 
maybe parochialism and a lack of inclusiveness. It may inadvertently lead to the sometimes toxic 
dynamic of in-groups and out-groups, such as through discrimination, bullying, shunning, and 
other behaviors. This may occur at a level that is difficult to detect but in a form that has great 
impact over time.  Certainly, the research on discrimination, for example, indicates that 
individuals have unconscious biases towards minorities that can result in an accumulation of 
disadvantages over time (e.g., Agars, 2004; Fiske, 2002). 
 
Poonamalle and Gotz: Beyond Social Exchange Theory 
 
 
INTEGRAL REVIEW    March 2014   Vol. 10, No. 1 
74
Further, just as how behaviors based on the ego-centric mental model can be self-limiting, in 
this case, a focus on the tribe can lead to a sort of prisoners’ dilemma effect in that resources 
gained for the tribe at the expense of outsiders can ultimately have negative effects on all, both 
tribe members and non-members.  This is illustrated by research that indicates that countries with 
social heterogeneity and large inequities, such as in the form of income inequality and economic 
discrimination among groups, have lower trust levels between economic agents and lower 
economic growth, creating a poverty trap (Zak & Knack, 2001). Therefore, while a tribal-centric 
view may be meaningful and productive in the short and medium term, its narrow awareness of 
scope of impact and related limited relational directionality which gets manifested as ‘Us Vs 
Them’ mentality is likely to be problematic in the long term, especially in complex situations and 
problems. 
 
Although, as discussed, much of tribal behavior may result from emotional attachments or be 
genetically programmed as a result of evolution, when there is more of a choice, a cognitive, top-
down processing could certainly lead to a mental model that belonging to a tribe may be more 
effective for survival than not belonging. 
 
Third Circle: Interdependence-centric 
 
Much of existing research on prosocial behavior that goes beyond the social exchange theory 
driven models is done on the second circle by the positive organizational researchers.  However, 
much of this research is based on the assumptions of immediacy, proximity, interaction and a 
relational or caring ethic. In the third and final circle, we describe a transcendent mental model 
that is predicated upon the most expansive understanding of interconnectedness of all sentient 
beings in the web of life. In this circle, people have moved from situationally motivated 
prosocial or moral behavior to more enduring concern about others’ welfare (Batson, et al. 1995) 
leading to a sense of oneness and a merging of self-other boundaries (Cialdini, et al. 1997). For 
such helping behavior based on a transcendent mental model, one needs to be objectively self-
aware (Carson & Miller, 1987), possess emotionality (i.e. the tendency to experience emotions), 
and have a highly developed set of emotional regulatory processes (Eisenberg, 2000). This is in 
line with Oschner, et al.’s (2005) conclusion that cognitive capacities and emotional capacities 
go together.  
 
We find two extremely different  and seemingly opposed frameworks as helpful anchors for 
this circle: one based on an abstract and rational idea of humanity grounded in the enlightenment 
tradition of entitlement and rights, and the other grounded in spiritual and religious traditions of 
moral responsibility towards fellow creatures. 
 
According to the first framework, this mental model is based a moral sensibility or concern 
for remote strangers from different continents, cultures, and societies (Hoijer, 2004) based on an 
abstract and rational idea of humanity (Sznaider, 1998) arising from democratization. It is a 
rights-based approach related to personal responsibility. Therefore, this model tends to 
distinguish between those who may be called ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’ of compassion. This 
is echoed in Skitka’s (1999) finding that both liberals and conservatives were generally equally 
likely to ascribe more personal responsibility and blame to both communities and individuals 
that did not take adequate flood precautions than those that did while seeking federal disaster 
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assistance.  Lerner and Simmons (1966) present evidence for the argument that whether observer 
reactions to the innocent victim take the form of compassion or rejection depend on the 
observer’s need to believe in a just world and the belief that there is an appropriate fit between 
effort and outcome.  
 
The second approach to such benevolence is grounded in spiritual and religious traditions. 
Haidt and Graham (2006) argue that community, authority, and the sacred are the sources of 
moral values across people and cultures. Both Eastern and Judeo Christian traditions have 
emphasized the role of compassion in salvation or wisdom. Sznaider (1998) describes the 
Christian principle of ‘love thy neighbor’ as a manifestation of God’s agape, a spontaneous, 
unconditional and unmotivated by the value of the one who is loved. Similarly, according to 
Buddhism, compassion exists when one has the wisdom to see all sentient beings are very much 
interdependent, and therefore, the question of worthiness is not part of the picture in this 
approach. Compassion in this tradition flowers out of the assumption that we are all connected in 
the tapestry of life by our own human spirituality and connectedness to the planet as a whole 
(Long, 1997). It is a set of deeply held values and beliefs that guide a particular community or 
society in their relationship with nature as a whole, which includes other human beings 
(Poonamallee, 2011a). In this model, compassion and wisdom go together because one operates 
from an understanding that all sentient beings are interconnected and operate as one and focuses 
on the ideal of unity.  
 
Both the enlightenment and spiritual traditions that can serve to anchor behavior in this third 
circle would require a person to use a postconventional schema, in the words of the neo-
Kohlbergian tradition of moral development (Narvaez, 2005).  In this type of reasoning, social 
conventions are not inviolate; instead, principles and values are key.  Moral obligations are based 
on sharable ideals rather than ethnocentric preference (Narvaez, 2005).  This approach requires 
more cognitively complex thinking, which provides more flexibility. This flexibility in thinking 
comes from a greater exposure to various situations: research indicates that the more education 
and the richer one’s social experience, including multi-cultural experience, the greater the 
development of postconventional thought (Narvaez, 2005). For example, in Kohlberg’s (1969, 
1971) postconventional phase, individuals recognize that compromises are sometimes needed 
because notions of what is just can differ since the distribution of resources and rewards can be 
based on a number of criteria, such as self-interest, physical characteristics, need, relationship 
ties, and behavior or productivity (e.g., Thomson & Jones, 2005). Therefore, post-conventional 
thinking is based on open scrutiny and debate (Narvaez, 2005).  
 
This paper does not argue for either the humanistic or spiritual approach. But drawing on both 
frameworks, we argue that collectively held beliefs and values of any social group– be they 
grounded in traditions of spirituality or in enlightenment – have an impact on creating and 
sustaining a transcendent mental model for human interaction. In fact, there is sufficient 
evidence both faith and spirituality based groups and non-spiritually or religiously inclined 
radical rational humanist societies operate based on this transcendent mental model. 
Scandinavian and western European countries, among the least religious wealthy countries, are 
also most likely to contribute very generously to foreign nations. For example, the Norwegian 
government has the distinction of the highest per capita contribution to foreign aid (104 cents per 
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person) but is also among the least religious wealthy nations.2 Similarly, Sweden and Denmark 
also rank among high contributors of foreign aid while falling among the least religious nations.3 
Citizens of these countries also contribute towards providing a high quality of life for their own 
citizenry in terms of universal healthcare, education, environmentally friendly transportation etc. 
Common to both traditions is the transcendent mental model that suspends social exchange 
theory on a long-term basis. 
 
Movement between the Circles 
 
One of the primary ways in which our framework is different from Kohlberg’s discussion of 
moral development (1969, 1971) is that in our view, movement between mental models is neither 
unidirectional nor does it arise solely from moral development. It is possible to move between 
circles triggered by either top-down/cognitive processes and/or bottom-up affective processes. 
To illustrate the various possibilities in terms of movement between the three circles, we 
constructed Table 2, which includes examples of movement that could be driven by top-down or 
bottom-up processing.   
 
Table 2: Examples of Transition Types from Circle to Circle 
Direction of 
Movement 
Top-down Processing Bottom-Up Processing 
Outward Organizational socialization into 
a compassionate culture (Circle 1 
to 2) 
Regular meditation practice 
(Circle 2 to 3) 
Pro-social behavior in terms 
of empathetic response to co-
workers (Circle 1 to 2) 
Pro-social behavior in terms 
of empathetic response to 
strangers in crisis (Circle 2 to 
3) 
Inward Protective response to ongoing  
survival pressures, e.g., 
immigration, competition (Circle 
3 to 2 or 2 to 1) 
Experience of sudden serious 
threats to own basic needs 
(Circle 3  or 2 to 1) 
 
We have termed movement from a less inclusive to more inclusive circle ‘outward 
movement’ and the movement from an outer to an inner circle, ‘inward movement’. Generally 
speaking, we view outward movement, in which the focus is beyond the ego concerns or even 
the tribe, to signal growth in an individual’s, group’s, or organization’s mental model 
development. This is because the more expansive mental models represent more cognitively 
complex thinking, such as by taking into account how beings are interconnected and how they 
impact each other in complex ways.  Thus, egoistic and tribal concerns are allowed for in the 
third circle, but they are put in their proper places.  However, it should be noted that moving to a 
more self-focused mental model that excludes more expansive thinking may sometimes be called 
for in the situation and it is not necessarily the case that a narrowing focus represents regression. 
                                                 
2 http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0930884.html  
3 http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx  
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There are instances when an egoistic focus is needed for self-protection or growth, for example, 
that then can allow for a later more permanent movement to a more expansive mental model.   
 
Recall that research indicates that mental models are fairly resistant to change (e.g., Swann & 
Read, 1981), change primarily when individuals are motivated to more deeply process 
information that is discrepant with their models (e.g., Rousseau, 2001), and even then, usually 
change slowly (e.g., Welch Larson, 1994). Therefore, for movement to occur between circles and 
for mental models to change more permanently, we believe that some time must elapse during 
which cognitive restructuring is occurring in response to changing conditions.  This could be 
exposure to different cultures, for example, as suggested by the research that indicates more 
cultural exposure is associated with more post-conventional thinking (Endicott, Bock, & 
Narvaez, 2003).    However, it is also possible that bottom-up emotional processing will trigger 
movement between circles to broader inclusivity. In these cases, we expect the movement to be 
more immediate and short-term in nature and movement back to earlier, less inclusive, mental 
models will be likely at some point unless sufficient top-down processing occurs as well. For 
example, movement between the second and third circles may occur in response to the suffering 
of strangers during a disaster.  But this can be transient if the response was driven solely bottom 
up or affectively driven without an accompanying top down cognitive reconstruction. This is 
equally applicable to any change in external stimuli.  If organizations want to move beyond ego 
and social identity centric behavior, such as when trying to generate inclusiveness in the 
organization, they can use more affect-generating practices (e.g., how would you feel in this 
situation of discrimination), but these might be short-term in effectiveness.  Cognitive practices 
that focus on oneness and interdependence might be more long-term. For example, the effect of 
an emotionally charged training program to change attitudes and behaviors may dissipate over 
time without sufficient cognitive restructuring to make it longer lasting.  
 
Outward Movement  
 
Outward movement is possible based on positive cognitive framing or emotional arousal. 
Top-down processing that leads to outward movement is more likely to take place over a longer 
period of time than bottom-up process that leads to outward movement and the effects are likely 
to be more permanent in nature. An example of movement from Circle 1 to 2 is the socialization 
of new members into organizational culture. A newcomer enters an organization on the basis of 
an individual employment and psychological contract with the employer, i.e. Circle 1 and moves 
towards Circe 2 through socialization.  Organizations achieve this through a top-down 
mechanisms of clarification of roles and relationships (e.g., see Bauer, Bodner, Erdogan, 
Truxillo, & Tucker, 2007).  This adoption by the newcomer of the mental model used by the 
organization may represent a movement from a more ego-centric mental model to a tribal one 
(first circle to second circle) and engender organizational citizenship behaviors thus moving the 
employee from an ego-driven individualistic identity to one of organizational identification.  
 
An example of a top-down cognitive restructuring mechanism moving from Circle 2 to Circle 
3 is regular meditation practice. The research literature on meditation suggests it stimulates 
movement from a circle two mental model to a circle three mental model, since its effects 
include non-judgmental acceptance, compassion, and an increased sense of connectedness with 
others (for a review, see Goltz, 2011). Meditative practices increase calmness and wellbeing 
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(Friedman & Coates, 2000) and result in an ability to respond non-habitually (Wenk-Sormaz, 
2005). In addition, the wisdom and spiritual-based reasoning that can arise from practices such as 
meditation emphasizes more collective and universal concerns, transcending concerns about self 
(e.g., Achenbach & Orwoll, 1991; Dehler & Welsh, 1994; Orwoll & Perlmutter, 1990; Pascual-
Leone, 1990).   
 
Outward movement can occur from bottom-up, affective processing as well.  Disaster 
research as well as research on compassion towards strangers indicates that social exchange 
norms are suspended or relaxed during breaching moments such as large-scale natural disasters, 
and compassion and empathy is directed towards those with whom one does not share 
organizational or social identification and who might not be able to reciprocate the help (e.g., 
Comfort, 2006; Haidt & Graham, 2006; Hoijer, 2004; Nussbaum, 2001; Poonamallee 2012; 
Viscusi &  Zekhauser, 2006; Weine, et al, 2002).  For example, altruistic and prosocial behaviors 
in disaster contexts take the form of volunteerism (Taylor, 1970), donations (Argothy, 2003), 
provision of emergency medical services to the victims (Quarantelli, 1983), search and rescue 
(Durkin, 1987), and sharing of knowledge and expertise to develop community psychosocial and 
civic infrastructure (Weine, et al. 2002). Prosocial behaviors are thought to be triggered due to 
personal distress (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987) since people can see themselves as potential 
sufferers at some point, which can lead to an emotional arousal that moves them beyond both the 
first and second circles to the third one. However, this expansion of identity may not be sustained 
over periods of calm unless there is a cognitive reframing of some sort. The good news is that 
this behavior can be generated through top-down processes as well. For example, Douty’s (1972) 
economic approach to post-disaster cooperative behaviors as consistent with enlightened self-
interest is more cognitively based. So is Dynes’ (1994) description of situational altruism, which 
emerges when the new victims’ needs cannot be met by existing institutional resources.  
Prosocial behavior based on a more permanent third circle mental model is needed in an era of 
ecological overshoot that will depend on compassion and kindness, not only during disasters but 
continually (Cairns, Jr., 2005).   
 
Inward Movement 
  
As we have indicated, we expect that  inward movement generally does not represent 
growth in cognitively complex thinking and so, outward movement is more desirable than 
inward movement.  However, inward movement is expected to occur at times and these 
occurrences are likely to fall into one of two categories. First, as discussed, an increased focus on 
self or tribe to the exclusion of others outside those circles is likely to happen when the more 
inclusive mental model was achieved through bottom-up, rather than top-down processing. For 
example, after the worst of the disaster appears to be over, the mental model of helping strangers, 
even natural enemies that was stimulated through emotional arousal recedes into the background, 
and the tribal-centric model re-emerges.  
 
Second, we expect that inward movement will commonly happen when the self or tribe is 
threatened in some ways in terms of the ability to meet basic needs.  This threat could be 
processed either cognitively or emotionally. A sudden threat is likely to be processed affectively 
bottom-up and longer term, a slowly emerging threat is likely to be processed top-down.  If the 
threat is sudden and emotionally processed, it is possible that upward movement to the previous 
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mental model will occur once the threat has been handled. If the threat has been more long term 
in nature, stimulating cognitive processing, then a return to the earlier, more inclusive mental 
model is unlikely unless additional cognitive restructuring occurs that stimulates that movement. 
 
Implications for Theory and Practice 
 
We believe this model is broadly applicable and can help significantly expand the focus of 
research on social interactions inside and outside organizations.  For purposes of illustration and 
brevity, however, we focused two research areas that we believe could particularly benefit from 
the integrative framework: organizational justice and corporate social responsibility (CSR). We 
summarize them here and also discuss some aspects of our framework that could use additional 
development in future work. 
 
Most explanations for the concept of organizational justice (e.g. Fortin & Feelenz, 2008) are 
based on instrumentality and equity (Kahan & Rapoport, 1984; Sunahara & Pierce, 1982). 
However, these two explanations are often at odds because sometimes equity seems to rule and 
sometimes instrumentality does (for reviews, see Goeree & Holt, 2001; Kagel & Rogh, 1995). 
Recall, for example, that fair offers rather than self-interested ones are common in the ultimatum 
game (Chiang, 2008; Zoolman, 2008).  Our model could help account for these disparate 
findings.   Equity and instrumentality may arise from two very different mental models:  
expectations of parity might be seen more in the tribal-centric circle and less so in the egocentric 
one, in which individual instrumentality would rule.   However, our integrative framework also 
suggests that organizational justice research should be expanded beyond a reliance on economic 
and equity models of behavior because these models tend to neglect studying justice beyond 
immediate networks of dyadic social relationships and don’t do well at examining justice across 
the tribe as well as with those outside the tribe. 
 
Research in this area should begin to use broader models of justice that can more easily be 
applied beyond the dyadic social exchange, such as the fairness model based on the concept of 
groups as patches (Goltz, 2013), which recognizes that multiple levels are operating in terms of 
the exchange of resources and that groups simultaneously manage these multiple levels so that 
over the long term, equity is achieved across individuals.  Still, the Goltz (2013) model seems 
more relevant to the second circle in our integrative framework and would need to be expanded 
to include a larger web of humanity and life to be truly what we mean by interdependence-
centric. 
 
Similarly, we believe that our integrative framework can help in moving CSR initiatives from 
the second tribal-centered circle to the third, i.e. the interdependence centric circle, which is a 
way to build an interconnected world. CSR as a research area has gone through multiple 
iterations (Frederick, 1987; Poonamallee, 2012; Waddock, 2004), starting from philanthropy and 
charity programs (CSR1), business benefits and bottom line impacts (CSR 2), legitimacy driven 
business ethics and voluntary compliance (CSR 3) and finally cosmos-centric corporations 
(CSR4). Although the cosmos-centric approach to CSR is a very appealing proposition, it is a 
normative model that is difficult to translate to practice. Part of the challenge is that unlike 
individuals, organizations cannot be considered to be moral actors (French, 1979; Goodpaster & 
Matthews, 1982; Ranken, 1987; Velasquez, 2003). Therefore, moral action must begin and end 
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with individuals. However, a cosmos-centric approach to CSR relies on other-oriented behaviors 
that are extended to external stakeholders including the larger community (Poonamallee & Joy, 
2012). This is even more expansive than organizational citizenship behaviors and/or prosocial 
behaviors that are mostly looked at within an organization, i.e. the tribal centric engagement 
(circle two) in this model.  Instead, it is more akin to circle three in our framework. For this 
transition from circle two to circle three to occur, there needs to be a shift in the shared mental 
models among the individuals. These organizations must develop a more expansive shared social 
identity that will encourage atypical behaviors that not solely governed by social exchange 
norms. The dominant conception of mental models guiding individual behaviors are based on an 
agency theory perspective (Battilana, 2006; Embiryaer & Mische, 1988; Garud & Kanoe, 2001), 
which in turn is based on motives of self-interest (Anderson & Hill, 2002; Coase, 1974; Hendry, 
2005).  
 
This paper contributes to this discourse by outlining mental models that are more inclusive 
than the traditional agency theory and social exchange theory perspectives. This paper describes 
how these mental models may be constructed through the use of top-down and bottom-up 
mechanisms. This transition may be effected through the use of the mechanisms of framing and 
affective arousal. The cognitive/top-down process is necessary to create a mental model of an 
interdependent social identity. This type of expansive identity then encourages and even inspires 
individuals to engage in circle three type of activities. At this point, the top-down and bottom-up 
processing research is located in individual responses to external stimuli. Further research can 
explore this relationship at meso and macro levels. This approach is particularly suited to a 
mixed method approach combining qualitative, especially interpretive and action research 
approaches, along with traditional quantitative approaches. 
 
Therefore, we believe that a framework that contains successively more expansive mental 
models could result in a better understanding of currently researched topics as well as stimulate 
new research streams.  But we caution that our framework is a preliminary one meant to 
stimulate thought and therefore needs to be further developed.    
 
One area that needs more examination is how this framework may differ depending on 
culture.  Cross-cultural research posits collectivism and individualism as dimensions of national 
culture (Hofstede, 1980) which suggests that some countries and cultures may be prone to 
operating in the tribal circle than others who may be more prone to operating in the egocentric 
first circle.  Therefore it is important to examine the role of national cultures in mental models to 
clearly identify the constraints of our proposed framework. It is also important to understand the 
effect of more local cultures.  As an example, Orozco and Poonamallee (2013) discuss how the 
knowledge of indigenous populations, which is often based on ecological embeddedness—one’s 
relationship with the environment, does not fit with the mental model of intellectual capital and 
intellectual property rights, which views knowledge as being “owned” and removes it from a 
sense of place. This difference in mental models creates a number of issues, such as the 
appropriation of indigenous knowledge.  This example also illustrates that an emphasis on social 
exchanges as primarily based on ego-centric thinking becomes problematic as more and more 
business occurs across cultures which draw on different frameworks. Considering more 
expansive mental models than the egocentric would help in solving these cross-cultural 
dilemmas. 
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Another area in which more development is needed is in the specification of movement 
between circles.  In our paper, we have offered some ideas of how this might occur, based on 
brain research. However, the framework could use more clarity on how earlier mental models 
(e.g., egocentric) are used, even during emotional stress, after higher mental models 
interdependence centric) have been developed and routinely applied.  Although we believe that 
individuals are adaptive and tend to use the mental model that best fits the situation once they 
have sufficiently developed the ability to use each mental model, it is also possible that these 
mental models not only follow a developmental progression, such as in the neo-Kohlbergian 
framework (Narvaez, 2005), but also that people who use more expansive mental models tend to 
disparage narrower ones, as has been found in research on moral development (e.g., Rest, 1973).  
Concepts from the hierarchical need theories of Maslow (1954) and Alderfer (1969) might be 
helpful for this analysis as well.  Maslow (1954), for example, discussed the concept of the 
prepotency process, which indicates that lower order needs must be satisfied before upward 
progression occurs, which suggests that use of a more expansive mental model by an 
organization might not be possible if a tribal identity has not been well developed.  Alderfer 
(1969) thought that different need states operated simultaneously and that individuals could 
operate at higher level needs without fulfillment of lower level ones, but he also indicated that 
individuals might, when frustrated by their attempt to meet higher level needs, put more 
emphasis on lower order ones.  Certainly, Alderfer’s frustration principle would be consistent 
with our belief that emotional triggers such as stress might sometimes stimulate the use of a more 
egocentric mental model.  As can be seen, there is yet much to consider and explore in terms of 
the progression and the application of the mental models. 
 
An additional limitation that we wish to acknowledge is that we have chosen to focus on three 
major types of mental models, but we also understand that one could readily identify subcircles 
within each of the three circles.   For instance, in the second circle, family members no doubt 
generate a somewhat different mental model than friends, which are probably associated with a 
somewhat different mental model than tribal members that are acquaintances.  Similarly, in the 
third circle, minerals, plants, animals, and humans are likely associated with different mental 
models for most people; for example, some of these generating a sense of connectedness more 
readily than others.   Furthermore, we have chosen to stop at the socio-ecological in our 
framework, but it could be argued that mental models could be extended out further to include 
elements that exist beyond what we can perceive as being part of our environment.  Therefore, 
future work in this area could both work on the more subtle layers of mental models as well as 
more extended ones.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have described an integrative model of engagement and the underlying 
mental models that govern various modes of engagement. The framework serves to extend our 
understanding of engagement in that it considers atypical behaviors that are not ego-centric and 
driven solely by social exchange norms. Specifically, it brings together research on tribal-centric 
prosocial behaviors, suffering-centric engagement focused on unknown others, and an 
interdependence-centric engagement based on traditions of spirituality and religion, and 
democracy, and enlightenment. This paper also draws on recent brain research on top-down and 
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bottom-mechanisms to explain the creation of mental models thereby extending the 
understanding of mental models to include both affective and cognitive mechanisms.  
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